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I’ve been asked to address the question, Is it possible to
do quantitative survey research in an interpretive way?, which
requires first identifying what an “interpretive way” is.  I will
consider three ways of distinguishing interpretive research—
in terms of its objectives, epistemological assumptions, and
modes for analyzing empirical materials.  My question, thus,
becomes, Is quantitative survey research, as ordinarily prac-
ticed, capable of achieving interpretive research objectives,
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Endnotes
1My thanks to Tim Pachirat and Peri Schwartz-Shea for their
comments on an earlier draft, which helped me make some of my
tacit knowledge about these methods more explicit, and to John
Gerring for his editorial suggestions.  The epigraph comes from a
post by Tom Nichols to the Perestroika listserv (October 3, 2003).
2One could count, for example, the large number of hours of
observation, the number of conversations held, the number of inter-
actions, and the ensuing number of segments of interaction and/or
conversation analyzed over the course of the research project.  In
some sense, each one of these constitutes an “observation” as that
term is used in quantitative analyses.
3The phrase is Mark Bevir’s, made in the closing discussion at
the recent (2003) APSA roundtable on constructivist and interpre-
tive methods.
4For discussions of these debates and references to original
sources, see, e.g., Abbagnano (1967), Hawkesworth (1988),
Polkinghorne (1983), Rabinow and Sullivan (1979).  Although
Hawkesworth’s book is addressed to the field of policy analysis, the
first half constitutes an excellent delineation of the philosophical
issues at hand.
5Many critical theorists have accused phenomenologists, in
particular, of disregarding issues of power and structure in their fo-
cus on the Self.  Whereas this criticism may well hold at the level of
philosophy, once one brings interpretive philosophies into the prac-
tical realm of political studies, one can hardly escape questions of
power and structure.  Hence, the overlap of concerns with some criti-
cal theory.
6Such data are “accessed” more than they are “gathered” or
“collected.”  Neither acts nor, one hopes, objects or aency docu-
ments are removed from the field setting in which they occurred.
What is brought back are the researcher’s copious interview and/or
observational notes, although copies of documents, interview tapes,
and the like may be brought out of the field.  This makes creating a
database for other researchers’ use problematic.
7I thank Tim Pachirat (personal correspondence, 2003) for draw-
ing my attention to the fact that positivist and interpretive research-
ers most likely understand “testability” — as reflected in the state-
ment “I was wrong about my findings” — in different ways.  The
difference reflects, at least, the distinction between seeing findings
as reflections of objective reality and seeing them as constructions
of that reality.  I think his observation is correct.  I have in mind the
willingness to subject one’s findings to scrutiny in an attitude of
humility in the face of  the possibility that one might be wrong,
coupled with the passionate conviction that one is right (cf. Yanow
1997).  I do not have the space to develop that point more fully here.
8But such a meaning-focused study is unlikely to tackle 150
disparate cultural sites!
9This point about readers’ interpretations lies at the heart of
“reader-response” arguments in literary theory; see, e.g., Iser (1989).
The strongest argumentation for using aspects of the interviewer to
elicit responses, including for responding critically when told some-
thing one disagrees with, is a contested issue among interview re-
searchers.  See, e.g., Holstein and Gubrium (1995) for one view.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.998757
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I offer four such objections to quantitative survey research.
1.  Survey research’s attempts to uncover people’s beliefs
and feelings impose a view of the relevant phenomenon on
the respondent.  This is usually by way of “closed-ended” ques-
tions that impose the researcher’s own beliefs and commit-
ments—be they articulated (as, for example, via operational
definitions of concepts), or implicit (as, for example, via ideo-
logical bias). To take an example, survey researchers have long
been interested in whether citizens’ policy views have a self-
interested basis.  For any given policy, researchers usually first
stipulate what kinds of interests are at stake, and then stipulate
(“measure”) for whom the policy is advantageous and for whom
it is detrimental.  They do not ask people what interests they
see at stake, or how they see their own interests furthered or
hindered by a policy.
They could, of course, move in this direction.  Indeed, the
survey tool of the “open-ended”: question is designed to ac-
commodate this objection.1  In some pilot work that I con-
ducted, using open-ended questions in a large-scale survey, I
found that people’s own sense of their interests did not con-
form to the conceptualization usually provided by research-
ers.  For example, people worried a lot about whether a na-
tional health care plan would restrict their freedom to choose
health insurance coverage levels, providers, doctors, and the
like.  The typical approach to studying self-interest ignores
beliefs concerning freedom of choice, placing it in the realm
of values and not interests.2
2.  Survey research, with its emphasis on standardized
interviews and interviewing techniques, treats the research
enterprise as obtaining a “pure” or “true” response from the
subject, and fails to appreciate that the researcher and subject,
or at least the interviewer and subject, are engaged in an inter-
action that jointly produces the results.  Particularly if one
tries to move away from closed-ended toward more open-ended
questioning, interviewers must be recognized as actively in-
volved in the creation and interpretation of survey responses.
Survey researchers are, of course, aware of this to some
extent, as reflected in work on “interviewer effects.”  Scholars
like Lynn Sanders and Darren Davis, for example, have stud-
ied how the race of one’s interviewer seems to shape survey
responses and interpret these findings substantively, as the re-
sult of racially charged interactions in the survey interview
setting.  Still, most survey researchers view interviewer ef-
fects in a manner much less compatible with the interpretivist
epistemological perspective: interviewers can be sources of
both random and systematic error, which to the extent pos-
sible must be eradicated through improved training and inter-
viewing techniques.
3.  Survey research is doomed to fail in truly discovering
how people make sense of politics and where those meanings
come from because it abstracts individuals from their social
and institutional contexts.  My sense, and I confess I am not at
all clear on this, is that scholars pursuing interpretive work
believe that one cannot rightly come to understand what any
one person believes without studying the beliefs of other people
who are embedded in her life, and the beliefs of others that are
embedded in her life through the media, curricula, novels, and
reflecting interpretive epistemological assumptions, and en-
abling interpretive modes of analysis? And, To what extent
can survey research practices be modified to incorporate an
interpretivist project?  I offer these comments as a quantita-
tive survey researcher who is struggling to understand the chal-
lenges posed to survey research by interpretive approaches.
Research Objectives
Let’s say that the objective of interpretive political re-
search is to understand how people make sense of political
phenomena, to understand what any given political problem
or policy or action or event means to them.  If so, we immedi-
ately confront a disjuncture with survey research as it is ordi-
narily practiced.  Much survey research in political science is
not focused on how people make sense of politics, how they
experience and understand it.  Instead, it focuses on how some
measurable property, A (e.g., a person’s level of education),
relates to another measurable property, B (e.g., a person’s level
of support for affirmative action policies), by way of testing
causal hypotheses about the force exerted by A on B.
But, still, lots of other survey-based research in political
science is directly interested in depicting what people believe
and how they feel about political phenomena, not merely in
establishing regularities between pairs of “objective” attributes.
The numerous examples include work on how people under-
stand and explain racial inequality, the “party images” research
on how people understand the policies and values political
parties advocate and the constituencies they serve, and the stud-
ies of Americans’ dissatisfaction with campaigns and govern-
ment.
Moreover, even if the question of interest to survey re-
searchers concerns the causal link between attributes—say,
that between education and opinion on affirmative action—
the lingering question of mechanism shifts researchers atten-
tion back to peoples’ ideas and experiences.  Attempting to
understand why education influences opinions on affirmative
action leads survey researchers to ask how people who differ
in their educational achievement come to differ in their be-
liefs, feelings, and experiences concerning affirmative action,
which then produce differences in opinion.  In short, mecha-
nism questions invite rather than preclude exploration of the
subjective.
Even so, such an enterprise—fitting “meaning” into an
explanation of the link between two objective attributes—may
still be found wanting.  It either implicitly or explicitly entails
that meaning is shared among those who share objective at-
tributes like education levels, and only differ in important ways
(so as to make them worthy of study) among those who differ
in objective attributes.  Further, it privileges objective attributes
as the prime movers in the story of where politically conse-
quential outcomes come from.
Epistemological Assumptions
Even if survey research hones in on an interpretive objec-
tive, perhaps it will fail to honor an interpretive epistemology.
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(nomothetic vs. idiographic) dichotomy.  Even if one were
able to expand the verbal materials obtained in large-n research
and subject them to sophisticated latent coding prior to a quan-
tification step, any subsequent statistical analysis would link
variable to variable.  It would focus on how individual differ-
ences of one kind (variable 1) relate to individual differences
of another kind (variable 2).  From an interpretive perspective
one might argue that two analytical errors are thus made.  Be-
cause the chosen variables are abstracted from the rest that
make up the case as a whole no single case is adequately rep-
resented in the analysis.5   At the same time, the between-per-
son analysis technique does not illuminate what is going on
within individuals.
Of course, survey analysts can respond to some extent by
building in complex statistical interactions between variables,
which moves them in the direction of a more case-centered
analysis (looking at how outcomes vary across individuals
defined by collections of attributes simultaneously).  But the
statistical tools currently available won’t take one far in this
direction.
Final Thoughts
I think it stimulating and productive to move questions
like the conflict between interpretive and quantitative research
to the concrete plane of actual practice.  Such a dialogue is
capable of enhancing researchers’ methodological self-aware-
ness and perhaps even spurring innovation—improving the
work of those in each mode and maybe even motivating a sub-
stantive (not methodological) dialogue between them.  Ulti-
mately, I believe that the epistemology of interpretivism is so
roundly incompatible with the positivism underlying many
quantitative survey research practices that there is no way to
fully reconcile the two.  Still, as I have tried to suggest, there
are points of accommodation.  Speaking as a survey researcher,
I think I benefit from thinking about the interpretivist chal-
lenge (which I cannot claim to have gotten right here).  I have
a better, and more reflective, sense of the particular epistemo-
logical viewpoint that underlies that data collection and analysis
tools I use, and I am at least sometimes stirred to alter or aban-
don them in the face of their limitations.
Endnotes
1Still, even open-ended questions embed researchers’ assump-
tions and choices, and studies have shown that minor variation in
question wording can elicit widely different responses.
2My favorite published example of survey-based public opin-
ion research that seriously attempts to grapple with this general criti-
cism from interpretivists is ElizabethTheiss-Morse, Amy Fried, John
L. Sullivan, and Mary Dietz’s  “Mixing Methods: A Multistage Strat-
egy for Studying Patriotism and Citizen Participation” ( in Political
Analysis, ed. James Stimson, 3: 89-121.  1991).  Rather than simply
designing survey questions to tap “patriotism” as they, themselves,
define it, Theiss-Morse et al. first try to uncover how “ordinary
Americans” think about patriotism using small-n, intensive research
and modes of analysis.  They then develop survey questions based
on the insights generated in this stage of their research.
the like.  The inherent intersubjectivity of meaning cannot be
revealed by the methodological individualism of traditional
survey research.
Perhaps this criticism of survey research, if valid, could
be accommodated by moving to research designs that intro-
duce network sampling and that link survey and media data.
Put another way, it does not appear to be survey research, it-
self, that is the problem here but the typical research design
that uses survey-based data collection.  This might be rem-
edied by sampling members of a relevant community (or net-
work) and analyzing the data by connecting part to whole, as
well as by linking survey data on individuals to data on the
media (and other texts) they consume.
4.  Survey research is incapable of fully revealing mean-
ing because it relies merely on self-reports, i.e. language, and
ignores how meaning is represented in other artifacts—acts,
objects—that need to be observed, directly.  Without joining
observational data and self-report data any understanding of
the subjective lives of individuals will be impoverished.  More-
over, survey research doesn’t even do a good job at getting at
meaning as revealed in language.  One cannot simply ask
people questions and expect meanings to pop out.  This is for
one or both of two reasons.  (A) People cannot consciously
access and articulate all that they feel and believe.3   (B) The
question and response mode of survey research, even when
open-ended questions are employed, is inadequate to the task
of revealing how people do make sense of political phenom-
ena.  One needs to elicit stories or narratives, for example, and
employ the many other conversational tools of in-depth inter-
viewing in order to generate the empirical materials capable
of illuminating meaning.
Modes of Analysis
A final possibility is that the modes of interpretive analy-
sis are incompatible with the quantitative analysis of survey
data.4   At least two different ideas are involved here.
The claim that important beliefs are inaccessible, men-
tioned above, emerges from a variety of psychological theo-
ries including those of psychodynamics and cognitive linguis-
tics.  Used to inform interpretive work, they suggest ways of
analyzing texts that seem blatantly at odds with standard quan-
titative coding techniques.  Take cognitive linguistics, for ex-
ample. From a cognitive linguistic perspective, if you are in-
terested in discovering how people think about something
complex and abstract like the harm of pornography you must
begin by getting the right kind of data; you must elicit a wide
range of impressions about pornographic media and its use by
individuals and across society.  But then these verbal materi-
als must be scrutinized for how the language people use re-
veals the metaphors they are implicitly but not explicitly us-
ing, and which reveal unarticulated, inarticulatable beliefs.
This kind of (“latent coding”) analysis is certainly at odds with
the manifest coding of open-ended materials that typifies the
survey researcher’s work.
The more standard criticism of quantitative survey analy-
sis involves the classic variable-centered vs. case-centered
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than that of “interpretivism” (on positivism, see Dessler’s con-
tribution to this symposium) and hence the content of any such
dichotomous contrast is highly ambiguous.  Moreover, since
few political scientists today identify themselves with posi-
tivism, an emphasis on anti-positivism does not communicate
to this audience any specifics about just how interpretivists
might differ from them.
Some more headway, but not much more, is made by ar-
ticulations that emphasize taking meanings seriously.  Such
articulations do differentiate interpretivists from scholars who
explicitly bypass meanings in favor of a focus on “objective”
features of society, polity, and/or economy (ex. Skocpol 1979:
chap. 1).  But they leave unclear how interpretivism stands in
relation to established political science research traditions
whose practitioners would also claim a concern with mean-
ings—conceptualized variously in terms of ideas, opinions,
attitudes, values, beliefs, etc.  Political scientists on the whole
have never given widespread support to approaches that re-
ject attention to meanings; and few, if any, in the discipline
ever bought into the argument that a concern with meanings is
incompatible with the drive to be scientific.  Indeed many prac-
titioners of two of the discipline’s most self-consciously “sci-
entific” research traditions—behavioral survey research and
rational-choice scholarship—would assert that meanings are
basic to their approach.  A persuasive articulation of the claim
that interpretivism is something tangibly different must hence
go beyond merely emphasizing attention to meanings.  It must
specify just how an interpretive approach breaks with the man-
ner in which established traditions conceptualize meanings,
conduct research into them, and employ the findings of such
research in their pursuit of further goals of inquiry.
When we shift away from the generic point of attending
to meanings to more specific questions about how meanings
are conceptualized, a break between interpretivism and other
approaches does come into focus.  Indeed, if pressed to choose
a criterion differentiating contemporary interpretivists, there
is perhaps no better candidate than their commitment to incor-
porating intersubjectivity into the way that we conceptualize
meanings.  From Charles Taylor’s classic “Interpretation and
the Sciences of Man”(1971), to Paul Rabinow and William
Sullivan’s overview of “The Interpretive Turn” (1979), to the
more recent formulations of such figures as Alexander Wendt
(1992), scholars charting the commitments of interpretivism
consistently turn to the notion of intersubjectivity.  They ar-
gue that meanings should not be conceptualized solely in sub-
jective terms as something that exists in the minds of indi-
viduals considered in isolation from one another, but also need
to be understood in intersubjective terms as something bound
up with concrete contexts of shared social practices and inter-
acting individuals.
Now, pausing to give our skeptics a chance to respond, I
imagine that they would acknowledge talk of intersubjectivity
as marking at least a rhetorical break, but would also follow
up with nagging worries as to what exactly this talk adds up
to.  When so pressed to explicate their commitment to
intersubjectivity, interpretivists seem to me to have two dif-
ferent responses available.  On the one hand, they may flesh
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Attention to “interpretivism” has become a vital topic in
the methodological conversations that this new APSA section
both reflects and promotes.  However it remains unclear just
what is meant by talk of an interpretive approach.  This ambi-
guity leaves some political scientists skeptical as to whether
interpretivists study topics or employ methods that involve
more than a rhetorical break with established practices in the
discipline.  I believe that interpretivism can and should be taken
as a distinctive approach to political science, but that it is in-
cumbent upon interpretivists to articulate more specifically
just what their underlying commitments are and how these
diverge from those of other approaches.  As I see it, the test of
any such articulation will be whether it can persuade skeptics
that something distinctive really is being proposed.
In this essay, I consider several points that have been
emphasized in articulations of what it might mean to be an
“interpretivist.”  I first suggest that some common points of
emphasis fail to win over skeptics because they simply do not
identify a criterion that persuasively differentiates
interpretivism from other approaches to political science.  I
then turn to interpretivism’s concern with the intersubjective
dimension of meaning.  I believe that this is the point most
capable of providing a differentiating criterion, but that ef-
forts to articulate interpretivism on this basis also bring out
divisions among interpretivists—in particular, between struc-
turalist and intentionalist variants of interpretivism.  I close
by proposing that, if they wish to persuasively articulate a di-
vergence from established practices in political science,
intentionalists should supplement their claims about
intersubjectivity with attention to the character of explana-
tion.
Articulations of interpretivism commonly emphasize the
anti-positivism of the approach.  However, this point fails to
speak to skeptics.  The meaning of “positivism” is no clearer
3But clues to people’s beliefs and feelings may still be found in
the language they use, as I discuss below.
4My distinction between “epistemological assumptions” or is-
sues and “modes of analysis” is artificial and the latter might best be
subsumed under the former.  But what I had to say in the last section
was about the data survey research provides while in this section I
am focusing in on what quantitative analysts do with that data.
5Of course, one need not know “everything” about a case be-
fore one knows anything; indeed, such a claim is incoherent.  But I
think that interpretivist analysis requires simultaneously taking into
account many different aspects or attributes of a case.
